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INTRODUCTION 
Much academic commentary these days concludes that 
trademark enforcement has become overly aggressive.  
Commentators argue that the increasingly expansive claims of 
rights by well-funded trademark owners are unreasonable, and thus 
that lawsuits asserting those rights amount to trademark bullying.
1
  
But I think many, if not most, trademark practitioners would take 
the contrary view that enforcement can only barely keep up with 
the constantly evolving and worsening threats to their clients‘ 
 
*   Associate Professor of Law, St. John‘s University School of Law.  This Essay 
developed from a talk given in the ―Trademark Enforcement Considerations‖ panel of the 
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal‘s 2011 Symposium 
entitled ―IP Bullying or Proactive Enforcement?‖  Thanks to the organizers of the 
symposium, the panel moderator Hugh Hansen, and my fellow panelists Irina Manta and 
James Barabas. 
 1 See generally Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 
625 (2011) (defining trademark bullying and providing a framework for curtailing the 
phenomenon through ―shaming‖); cf. Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant 
Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2010) (analyzing some particularly dubious theories of 
liability asserted by plaintiffs in trademark cases). 
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brands, particularly internationally and online.
2
  The purpose of 
this Essay is to try and bridge these two positions by critiquing 
each one from the perspective of the other. 
The first step in this exercise is to challenge my own camp, the 
academic camp, in this debate over the appropriate scope of 
enforcement.  If we academics think that trademark owners are 
over-enforcing their marks, we should ask ourselves: why would 
they do that?  Why would any trademark owner seek to enforce its 
marks unreasonably?  Why would its trademark attorneys advise it 
to do so?  I will examine these questions in three stages.  The first 
stage is a bare psychological inquiry: what might motivate 
somebody to do something unreasonable?  This is where I will 
introduce the dichotomy suggested by the title of this Essay (with 
apologies to the late Hunter S. Thompson).
3
  The second stage is a 
doctrinal inquiry: once we think we understand trademark owners‘ 
psychological motivations, we can look at the law‘s role in 
mediating them.  In particular, we ought to ask whether trademark 
doctrine is generating these motivations or responding to them in 
some way.  The third stage of the inquiry looks to the profession as 
the nexus of doctrine and action and questions the role of 
trademark attorneys in mediating these dynamics and advising 
their clients. 
I. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENFORCEMENT 
To begin with psychology, let me explain what I mean by fear 
and loathing.  By ―fear,‖ I mean that a trademark owner might take 
some enforcement action out of some concern that if they do not, 
they will lose something of value that they currently enjoy.  By 
 
 2 See generally Dalila Hoover, Coercion Will Not Protect Trademark Owners in 
China, But an Understanding of China’s Culture Will: A Lesson the United States has to 
Learn, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 325 (2011) (discussing persistent frustrations of 
American trademark owners with lax enforcement by the Chinese government, and the 
limits of legal and economic pressure in ameliorating the problem); Uli Widmaier, From 
Metatags to Sponsored Ads: The Evolution of the Internet-Related Trademark 
Infringement Doctrine, 4 LANDSLIDE 9 (2012) (discussing clients‘ frustration with 
keyword advertising and domain names that use their trademarks, and the difficulties 
their lawyers face in meeting these clients‘ demands to curtail such conduct). 
 3 Cf. HUNTER S. THOMPSON, FEAR AND LOATHING IN LAS VEGAS: A SAVAGE JOURNEY 
TO THE HEART OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (Random House 1971).  
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―fear,‖ then, I refer generally to fear of loss.  For example, the 
mark owner may be concerned that the conduct of a target of 
potential enforcement, if left unchecked, will result in a loss of 
business for the trademark owner.  The classic example and the 
easiest case is the passing off of an inferior product, which 
threatens not only to divert customers from the mark owner to the 
target of enforcement
4
 but also, over time, to deplete the mark 
owner‘s goodwill.5  We can understand enforcement actions 
against a defendant engaged in passing off shoddy goods as being 
motivated by this entirely justifiable fear. 
Alternatively, mark owners might be concerned about losing 
some legal interest or right that they currently enjoy if they fail to 
take enforcement action.  The classic example here is abandonment 
through acts of omission.
6
  Failing to enforce a mark over an 
extended period of time can ultimately, in an extreme case, lead to 
a complete loss of trademark rights.
7
  Again, enforcement actions 
taken to stave off the loss of one‘s trademark rights would seem to 
be entirely justifiable. 
If these examples suffice to illustrate ―fear,‖ the question 
remains what I mean when I refer to ―loathing.‖  By ―loathing,‖ I 
simply mean that a trademark owner might take some enforcement 
action, not because it is worried that in failing to do so it will lose 
something of value that it currently enjoys, but rather because it 
simply does not like or approve of the conduct against which it is 
pursuing enforcement.  One could imagine innumerable reasons 
for such disapproval.  One highly controversial reason might be 
that the enforcement target is expressing a viewpoint about, or 
 
 4 See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1860–63 (2007). 
 5 See id.; see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An 
Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269–70 (1987).   
 6 See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (―A mark shall be deemed to be 
‗abandoned‘ . . . [w]hen any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission 
as well as commission, causes the mark . . . to lose its significance as a mark.‖). 
 7 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
17:8 (4th ed. 2012) (―Sometimes a mark becomes abandoned to generic usage as a result 
of the trademark owner‘s failure to police the mark, so that widespread usage by 
competitors leads to a generic usage among the relevant public, who see many sellers 
using the same word or designator.‖); see also BellSouth Corp. v. DataNational Corp., 60 
F.3d 1565, 1569–70 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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creating some sort of connotation around, the mark owner‘s brand 
that paints the mark owner in an unflattering light in the eyes of the 
public,
8
 or is otherwise inconsistent with the mark owner‘s 
marketing or branding strategy.
9
 
We can see dilution by tarnishment as an example of this.  
Pillsbury may not want its family-friendly Doughboy character 
going into pornography, for obvious reasons.
10
  But we can also 
look at mark owners‘ efforts to discourage the use of their products 
by persons or in expressive works that are somehow inconsistent 
with the mark owners‘ brand strategies.  Such efforts do not always 
take the form of legal proceedings, or even saber rattling, but can 
rather take the form of persuasion, suggestion or even pleading 
with potential enforcement targets.  Consider the recent spat 
between Abercrombie & Fitch and the cast of The Jersey Shore, in 
which the clothing retailer publicly offered to pay the boorish cast 
members of the hit reality program not to wear its products.
11
  
There was no legal action taken, but there was, if not a threat, at 
least an attempt to persuade the target not to engage in certain 
conduct regarding the brand.
12
 
Another form of loathing might arise where the enforcement 
target is using the mark in a way that does not inflict any business 
losses on the mark owner (as, for example, passing-off would), but 
provides the potential target of enforcement with some benefit that 
the mark owner thinks is undeserved or is perhaps better deserved 
by the mark owner itself, even though the mark owner is not 
currently enjoying that benefit.  Here we can look to the emergence 
of a merchandising right,
13
 the expansion of infringement liability 
to non-competing goods,
14
 and, of course, dilution by blurring.
15
 
 
 8 See generally Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional 
Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. 
L. REV. 158 (1982); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression: Equality and 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993). 
 9 See generally Jeremy N. Sheff, Brand Renegades, 1 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. 
L. 128 (2011). 
 10 See generally Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124 (N.D. Ga. 
1981). 
 11 See Sheff, supra note 9, at 137–40. 
 12 See id. at 139.   
 13 See generally Boston Prof‘l Hockey Ass‘n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 
1004 (5th Cir. 1975); Univ. Book Store v. Univ. of Wisc. Bd. of Regents, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 
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It has to be admitted that the dichotomy that I have set up in 
this Part, between fear and loathing, is not a perfect one.  There is 
obviously going to be a mixture of motivations behind any 
particular enforcement effort, and they might mix to greater or 
lesser degrees.  But for reasons I will explore below, these appear 
to be the rhetorical poles that drive the debate over the proper 
scope of enforcement measures. 
II. TRADEMARK DOCTRINE: LEADING OR FOLLOWING? 
What, then, is the role of doctrine in enforcement decisions?  Is 
trademark doctrine, including the examples cited above, leading or 
following?  Is it creating mark owners‘ enforcement motivations or 
is it providing those motivations an outlet they would not 
otherwise have?  And in either case, is the motivation that doctrine 
is either creating or serving primarily one of fear or one of 
loathing? 
It is easiest to identify the one area—and I think it is really the 
only area—where doctrine is explicitly creating a motivation, and 
that is the so-called duty to police.  Professors Deven Desai and 
Sandra Rierson have argued that the threat of losing trademark 
rights incentivizes mark owners to undertake wasteful and 
undesirable policing activities, activities that even the mark owners 
do not want to undertake, but which they feel they must undertake 
on pain of losing some right that they currently enjoy.
16
  It may be 
that this fear is indeed responsible for driving at least some 
enforcement actions that we academics would denounce as 
bullying. 
 
(BNA) 1385 (T.T.A.B. 1994); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising 
Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 478–84 (2005). 
 14 See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
137, 181–84 (2010); see also James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in 
Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 907–23 (2007). 
 15 See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in 
Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 519–22 
(2008). 
 16 See Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1791, 1834–42 (2007). 
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In most other areas, I think that doctrine has generally been 
playing catch-up with the enforcement objectives of trademark 
owners, moving where the owners want enforcement to go, for the 
reasons that they want it to go there.  The merchandising right is 
one example.  In cases like University Book Store v. Board of 
Regents
17
 and Boston Hockey Association v. Dallas Cap & 
Emblem Manufacturing,
18
 a monopoly was created literally out of 
whole cloth and used to stamp out what had up to that point been a 
competitive market in branded merchandise—for example, for 
university and professional sports teams. 
With respect to sponsorship and affiliation confusion, Professor 
Jim Gibson at the University of Richmond has argued that doctrine 
responds to enforcement activity in a feedback loop of expanding 
trademark rights.
19
  In his telling, incrementally more aggressive 
enforcement actions by trademark owners produce a marketplace 
in which consumers develop increasingly credulous views of what 
might be a sponsorship or affiliation relationship, and those 
increasingly credulous views feed back into the likelihood-of-
confusion standard, to make ever-more aggressive assertions of 
trademark rights at least plausible.
20
  Again, the scope of 
infringement liability appears to be expanding to serve the 
motivations of trademark owners as expressed in their enforcement 
actions, rather than the other way around. 
A third example is the federal dilution statute,
21
 which, from 
my point of view, is a solution in search of a problem.
22
  For years 
the statute was a top legislative priority of the organized trademark 
 
 17 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (T.T.A.B. 1994). 
 18 510 F.2d 1004 (1975). 
 19 See Gibson, supra note 14, at 887. 
 20 See id. at 907–23; see also Sheff, supra note 9, at 145–48. 
 21 See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). 
 22 See generally Barton Beebe, The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: 
Evidence from the First Year of Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 449 (2008) (finding that courts treat dilution claims 
as superfluous to infringement claims); Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 
(2006) (documenting the decline in judicial favor for dilution claims). Compare Lanham 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(b) (2006) (setting forth statutory factors for determining 
whether dilution is likely), with Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 
(2d Cir. 1961) (setting forth remarkably similar common-law factors for determining 
whether confusion is likely). 
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bar.
23
  Congress eventually acquiesced, not only by passing a 
federal trademark dilution statute,
24
 but also by amending it to roll 
back a challenge to that statute from the Supreme Court in Moseley 
v. V Secret Catalogue.
25
 
So it seems that rather than generating fear among trademark 
owners that leads to enforcement activity, the law seems to be 
responding to trademark owners‘ demands by creating ever-greater 
opportunities for enforcement.  Moreover, in each of these 
examples, I would argue that the motives of mark owners that the 
law is scrambling to accommodate are not based in fear of loss, but 
rather in the desire to expand trademark rights into new frontiers 
where they had not yet been established—frontiers where they 
might well generate economic value for the mark owner, but also 
where others might otherwise (but for the expansion of those 
rights) have been able to realize some sort of commercial or 
expressive benefit without imposing any loss on the trademark 
owner.  So as a matter of doctrine, I would submit that trademark 
law has been much more a vehicle for mark owners‘ loathing 
rather than a source of their fear. 
III. THE ROLE OF COUNSEL 
Perhaps, however, this is an unfair assessment.  Let‘s take a 
step back at this point to consider the point of view of the 
trademark owner—or, more to the point, his counsel.  A trademark 
plaintiff‘s counsel might object that what I am categorizing as 
loathing really is fear: fear of losing the value of sunk investments 
in a marketing strategy; fear of losing prospective opportunities 
and potential areas of future expansion; fear of a slippery slope, of 
a death by a thousand cuts, of letting whatever strength a mark 
 
 23 See generally Jerre B. Swann, Sr., INTA and Dilution, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 159 
(2003) (discussing the influence of the International Trademark Association on the 
development, passage, and amendment of federal trademark dilution law).  
24  See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA), Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 
985 (1996). 
 25 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (interpreting the FTDA as requiring a showing of actual, as 
opposed to likely, dilution); see also Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA), 
Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006); 152 CONG. REC. S1921-01 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 
2006) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (describing the TDRA as a measure to clarify 
Congress‘s intent in the wake of Moseley, and undo that case‘s central holding).  
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currently has be whittled away, a process that begins with a single 
unanswered stroke by a potential enforcement target.  We 
academics have two responses to this line of argument. 
The first response is to disagree over baselines.  That is, 
academics argue that whatever mark owners are afraid of losing in 
these areas—a brand image or a brand personality, a prospective 
market of expansion in which the mark owner is not currently 
operating—is not properly theirs to begin with.  That is, what you 
are characterizing as fear is really loathing in disguise.  This is an 
argument that has been made in one form or another by a number 
of commentators, including Judge Kozinski,
26
 Professors Rochelle 
Dreyfuss,
27
 Wendy Gordon,
28
 Mark Lemley (joined alternately by 
Stacey Dogan
29
 and Mark McKenna
30
), and even myself.
31
  The 
baseline argument has considerable power because as a matter of 
intuition, I think, we are inherently more sympathetic to actions 
taken out of a fear of losing something than we are to actions taken 
based on loathing or jealousy of someone else‘s gain.  Such an 
intuition might be grounded in the cognitive psychology of gain 
and loss—losses loom larger than gains, the behavioral economists 
teach us.
32
  Moreover, this type of argument is not something that 
should be new to most lawyers; in our first year of law school we 
all learn that whether one considers a particular legal intervention 
to be preventing a harm or conferring a benefit is often in the eyes 
of the beholder and of the advocate.
33
 
This baseline debate is an important one to have.  It is a debate 
on which we might not ultimately come to some sort of agreement, 
 
 26 See generally Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 
(1993). 
 27 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in 
the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 397–99 (1990). 
 28 See generally Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993). 
 29 See generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note 13. 
 30 See generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. 
L. REV. 137 (2010). 
 31 See generally Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 767 (2012). 
 32 See generally CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky 
eds., 2000) (collecting research on loss aversion, status quo bias, framing effects, and 
other cognitive biases that can be influenced by the selection of a baseline). 
 33 See generally, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (wherein Justices 
Holmes and Brandeis dispute this distinction in a takings case). 
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but the arguments we will inevitably raise in defending our 
positions implicate values that are fundamental to setting up our 
markets and our society—values of competition, expression, and 
fairness.
34
  They implicate not only the efficiency of our consumer 
markets, but the distribution of the value generated by those 
markets and the non-economic interests of participants in those 
markets.
35
  These are all complicated empirical and moral issues 
that I think, as a discipline, we have not sufficiently grappled with. 
The empirical aspect of such questions leads us to the second 
response of academics to the practitioner‘s argument that what 
motivates zealous enforcement is fear of loss.  This argument 
accepts that mark owners‘ motivations are not only—or perhaps 
not at all—venal, but merely misinformed or misguided.36  This is 
a position that has been taken by Professor Rebecca Tushnet with 
respect to dilution,
37
 and by Professors McKenna and Lemley with 
respect to sponsorship and affiliation confusion.
38
  As an empirical 
matter, they argue, the slippery slope model is just not an accurate 
description of how consumers respond to the types of third-party 
uses of trademarks that are at issue in some of the more 
controversial cases where trademarks are being enforced in a 
particularly aggressive way.
39
  In fact, many such uses have no 
effect on consumer perception of the mark or its owner at all.
40
  
This argument is admittedly somewhat in tension with Professor 
Gibson‘s argument about enforcement feedback loops,41 but it has 
the benefit of being supported by empirical evidence in cognitive 
and consumer psychology.
42
 
 
 34 See generally Jeremy N. Sheff, Marks, Morals, and Markets, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) (establishing a framework for analyzing the moral arguments at work 
in trademark doctrines). 
 35 See Jeremy N. Sheff, Biasing Brands, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1245, 1249–51 (2011) 
(discussing the complex empirical issues underlying judgments about the appropriate 
scope of trademark rights). 
 36 See generally Tushnet, supra note 15. 
 37 See id. 
 38 See generally Lemley & McKenna, supra note 1. 
 39 See id. at 429.     
 40 See generally Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of 
Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 63 (2009). 
 41 See Gibson, supra note 14 at 907–23. 
 42 See McKenna, supra note 40, at 101–03. 
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This second argument raised by academics highlights the 
central role played by the trademark lawyer in the dynamics of 
enforcement—not only as advocate, but also as counselor.  For 
every unauthorized use of a mark that might become the target of 
enforcement activity by that mark‘s owner, there is an important 
question as to what the effect of the use on consumers, and thus on 
the mark owner‘s business, is likely to be.  One example that I 
have drawn in other work is the liquor market.
43
  For over a 
century, Courvoisier was known as the brandy of Napoleon, but 
today it is the brandy of Busta Rhymes.
44
  It may be just shy of 
exaggeration to say that the transformation saved Courvoisier.  It 
began, not with a planned shift of the marketing strategy within 
Courvoisier, but rather with the unauthorized invocation of the 
brand name in hip-hop lyrics, going back to the early 1990s.
45
 
Under the expansive notions of sponsorship and affiliation 
confusion that we have today, and potentially also under dilution 
doctrine, those types of invocations might well be the subject of at 
least a colorable claim that might survive a motion to dismiss.  But 
bringing that claim would have been a huge disaster for 
Courvoisier.  Consider Jay-Z‘s reaction to Cristal when an 
executive in the company that makes Cristal suggested—just 
suggested in an interview—that maybe he was not crazy about the 
association of Cristal with hip-hop nightlife.
46
  Jay-Z launched a 
boycott.
47
  He started promoting a competing brand.
48
  He took to 
the pages of Time magazine to drag Cristal through the mud.
49
  
Thus, the public relations consequences of enforcement action, and 
the business losses that can result from negative publicity, must be 
a consideration in any decision whether to take such action. 
 
 43 See Sheff, supra note 9, at 134–36. 
 44 See id. at 135–36.  
 45 See id. 
 46 See Sheff, supra note 9, at 136–37 & n.40, 140 & n.59. 
 47 See id.  
 48 See Louis Lanzano, Jay-Z Launches Bubbly Boycott of Cristal, USA TODAY (June 
15, 2006, 6:02 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/life/people/2006-06-15-jayz-cristal_x.htm 
(―Jay-Z plans to replace Cristal . . . with Krug and Dom Perignon at the Manhattan and 
Atlantic City locations of his 40/40 Club.‖). 
 49 See Jay-Z, Jay-Z on Cristal: ‘Disrespect for the Culture of Hip-Hop,’ TIME (Nov. 
18, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,2032217,00.html. 
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CONCLUSION 
In short, perhaps the most important piece of the enforcement 
puzzle is not the law that we academics sometimes complain is 
moving in the wrong direction, but the lawyers who bring 
trademark claims, and in particular the judgment that they bring to 
bear on the decision whether or not to assert a trademark claim.  To 
be fair, it is almost certainly malpractice not to advise your client 
on the potential consequences of failing to take action against an 
unauthorized user.  But the duty to police is not absolute—not 
every forbearance from enforcement will negatively affect a mark 
owner‘s legal rights50—and clients should know about that as well.  
Moreover, clients deserve to be reminded that enforcement activity 
comes at a cost, not only to society, not only to the targets of 
enforcement, but to the client itself.  Those costs are not just the 
direct costs of the enforcement in terms of attorneys‘ fees and 
expenses, but the indirect costs in terms of negative publicity and 
loss of business.  These indirect costs can be subtle but they are 
vitally important, as our culture continues to generate increasing 
demand for intangible and subjective sources of value. 
I recognize that many trademark attorneys undoubtedly face 
significant financial and professional incentives to maximize 
enforcement activity.  But I would suggest that those attorneys 
might still do well to critically examine the motivations for a 
particular enforcement action before advising a client whether or 
not to undertake it.  On the question of whether a particular 
motivation is properly categorized as fear or as loathing, it may not 
be the advocate‘s place to second-guess their client.  We 
academics and practitioners continue to fight that out, as we have 
in the past.  But on the question of whether a particular fear is well 
founded, I believe it is the attorney‘s duty—as counselor rather 
than advocate—to apply judgment and counsel moderation to her 
 
 50 See MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at § 17:17 (―While many defendants, and some 
courts, talk about such a failure to sue in terms of ‗abandonment,‘ other courts state with 
vigor that the failure to sue others is totally irrelevant. The truth lies somewhere in 
between.‖); see also STK LLC v. Backrack, Inc., Cancellation No. 92049332, 2012 WL 
2024459 (T.T.A.B. 2012), slip op. at 43–52, available at 
http://des.uspto.gov/Foia/ReterivePdf?flNm=92049332-05-21-2012&system=TTABIS 
(holding that failure to police keyword advertising uses of a trademark did not render a 
mark generic).  
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client, to resist the traditional risk-aversion of our profession that 
might be triggered by the potential consequences of forbearance, 
and to consider, above all, the business interests of her client.  This 
is especially true in a world where the actions of a mark owner 
towards its customers, its fans, its secondary market, its 
competitors, and even its critics increasingly play a role in 
constructing brand image and ultimately in generating demand. 
 
